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DAVID L. GRINDASTAFF #4043 
Attorney for Appellant 
431 South 300 East Suite 302 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-1370 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE 05 II 1 1 ! H, 
Plaintiff, ! 
vs. ] 
DOYLE KELSTROM, ] 
Defendant. ] 
) Case No: 940328-CA 
1 Priority No: 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT AND 
AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a denial of Appellantfs Motion to 
Withdraw Guilty Plea entered in the Second District Court, in and 
for Davis County, State of Utah. Appellaui appeal was 
originally filed in the Utah Supreme Court, however, was 
subsequently assigned fo the Utah Court of Appeals and assigned 
Appellant's case number 
This Court has jurisdiction to consider the Appellant's 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(f) and Utah R. App. 
P. 3., as this Court: has jurisdiction to review a fj nal decision 
entered by a district court of the State of Utah. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Whether Appellantfs guilty plea was made knowingly and 
voluntarily 
2. Whether the State violated its plea agreement with the 
Appellant. 
3. Whether Appellant received ineffective assistance of 
counsel because defense counsel Thomas V. Rasmusssen failed to 
raise two issues with respect to the Appellantf s Motion to 
Withdraw his Guilty Plea. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
The above-captioned case is a denial of withdrawal of a 
guilty plea. 
On or about April 29, 1992, Appellant was charged with Rape 
of a Child under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-402.1 (1953 as amended). 
(R., #15.) On or about September 8, 1992, Appellant subsequently 
pled guilty to the amended charge of Attempted Sexual Abuse of a 
Child under § 76-5-404.1. (Id.) The district court sentenced 
Appellant to the Utah State Prison for an indeterminate term of 
five years to life and ordered Appellant to pay restitution to 
for any required counseling costs of the victim. (R., Judgment 
and Commitment Order, File #47.) 
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Thereafter, Appellant represented by Thomas V. Rasmusssen 
filed a Motion and Accompanying Memorandum ox Points an 
Authorities I i U Llhdi ,iu i: L 11 i I «> I'li.i (Id. ., i, , 50 S # 53 
respectfully.) The State filed its Memorandum in Opposition. 
(See id. at # 72.) The district court denied Appellantfs Motion. 
(Id. at 
Appellant represented by defense counsel Brad Rich then 
filed a Motion to Amend an for Reconsideration of Defendant's 
Motion to Wi thdraw ( ., ea. (R F. i 3 < : # 83 ) Tl ie State 
filed a response. (Id. at # 148 The district court denied 
Appellant's Motion. (See id. at 152.) Appellant filed his 
Notice of Appeal in the Second Judicial District Court in and for 
Davis County, State of Utal: (R , Fil e # 154 ) However, the 
Utah Supreme Court dismissed Appellant's appeal because it was 
untimely. (R., File # 162.) 
Represented by present counsel, Appellant then filed a 
Motic Accompanying Memorandum * Authorities for 
Relief. File # 172, 174, respectfully.) The district court 
scheduled an evidentiary hearing for the matter. (R, File # 
179.) The State filed i ts response. (R., F:i :i e # 1 82.) The 
Court found that defense attorney Brad r i ch did not per fec t h i s 
appeal as requested and, accordingly, found that Appellant was 
( i e i i i € n 1 l i i i 111111 i n in 1 in in mi in I | i p p i M l l i l l li mi i n i i i i r i i l " . e n t P i H ' e 
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entered findings of fact, and ordered that Appellant's Motion to 
Withdraw his Guilty Plea is denied, and ordered that Appellant 
continue to serve his sentence. (R., File # 193-94.) Appellant 
then filed his Second Notice of Appeal in the Second Judicial 
District Court in and for Davis County, State of Utah. 
B. Statement of the Facts 
During Appellantfs sentencing phase, the following colloquy 
occurred: 
* * * 
Mr. Namba: Your Honor, I would like to submit for the 
Court!s consideration a certified document from 
* * * 
Mr. Namba: That indicates that he was ordered to have 
psychological treatment in Oregon. We have really at this point 
in time no way of verifying whether or not that was actually 
done. He testifies that he has not had psychological counseling. 
I think the point is that he was in the system where it was made 
available to him and if it wasn't done, it was him. He certainly 
could have affected that on his own. And Ifve received two names 
of counselors to whom their billings have been sent to the family 
for services to the defendant. And I don't know if the Court 
wants to hear from the family members to support that or if the 
Court would just inquire of the defendant his relationship with 
those therapists, Dr. Deleporto and Lee Mauret. Apparently there 
has been some therapy that!s been going on. 
Mr. Kelstrom: Dr. Deleporto was marriage counselor therapy. 
I was married to June who's a;so present here in the Court and 
she can testify to this, of she would, it was strictly marriage 
counseling type of therapy. They had nothing to do with sexual 
abuse. . . . There was a therapist but it was also a marriage 
counselor type of situation, not a sexual abuse therapist. . . . 
Mr. Namba: I guess the point for that is, your Honor, in 
marriage therapy the problems exist. Obviously he hasn't taken 
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advantage of -- those problems didnft surface in the therapy. He 
hasn't taken advantage of the therapy. 
The Court: Anything else? 
Mr. Namba: My agreement with counsel and with the Defendant 
in this matter with regard to my position at sentencing was that 
I would concur in the recommendation. But I think that!s 
important to the Court to have --
* * * 
Mr. Namba: I've at least made the portrayal for the Court 
to know what has happened. And I just the only other thing that 
I wanted to comment on was other cases we talked about. Counsel 
mentioned the Mcintyre case. And I just I think we talked -- I 
think he's referred to Michael Mcintyre case. This case is 
probably more proportional than the Mcintrye case. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Appellant received ineffective assistance of counsel when 
defense counsel Thomas V. Rasmussen failed to raise in 
Appellant's Motion to Withdraw his guilty plea two viable issues. 
Specifically, Rasmussen failed to raised the issue of whether 
Appellant's plea was made voluntarily and knowingly, and whether 
the State violated Appellant's signed plea agreement. Appellant 
asserts that his plea was not entered knowingly and voluntarily 
as required by Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(2), and supporting caselaw, 
and that the State violated the signed plea agreement that the 
State and the Appellant entered into. 
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ARGUMENTS 
I. WHETHER APPELLANT'S GUILTY PLEA 
WAS MADE KNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY 
Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e) provides that ff[t]he court may 
refused to accept a guilty plea . . . and may not accept the plea 
until the court has found: . . . (2) the plea is voluntarily made 
. . . " Id. In addition, 
[t]he standard for voluntariness of guilty pleas is that 
adopted by the Supreme Court in Brady v. United States [397 U.S. 
742, 755 (1970)]: "f [A] plea of guilty entered by one fully aware 
of the direct consequences, including the actual value of any 
commitments made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his own 
counsel, must stand unless induced by threats (or promises to 
discontinue improper harassment), misrepresentation (including 
unfulfilled or unfillable promises), or perhaps by promises that 
are by their very nature improper as having no proper 
relationship to the prosecutorfs business (e.g. bribes).1" 
Bailey v. Cowley. 914 F.2d 1438, 1440 (10th Cir. 1990) (Brady 
quoting Shelton v. United States, 246 F.2d 571, 572 n.2 (5th Cir. 
1957) (en banc) (quoting Shelton v. United States, 242 F.2d 101, 
115 (5th Cir. 1957), rev'd on other grounds. 356 U.S. 26, (1958)) 
(emphasis provided). 
Applying the foregoing to the instant case, Appellant 
asserts that his guilty plea was not voluntarily because 
represented to Appellant the following: "The prosecutor will 
provide Adult Probation and Parole with all information in the 
prosecution file regarding any known contacts regarding this 
case. Thereafter, the prosecutor agrees not to take further 
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action to uncover or invite input in aggravation of sentencing." 
(See, R., File # 39, Affidavit of Defendant at 1 7(u).) 
Although there was a representation made by the prosecutor 
(i.e., he would not take further action to uncover or invite 
input in aggravation of sentencing), that representation was not 
fulfilled. 
The foregoing is a clear misrepresentation as to what the 
prosecutor indicated he would not do. In order to comply with 
his representation to the Appellant, the prosecutor should have 
not said anything, but simply submitted the matter for 
sentencing. Specifically, "the prosecutor agree[d] not to take 
further action to uncover or invite input in aggravation of 
sentencing." (See, R., File # 39, Affidavit of Defendant at 1 
7(u).) Because the prosecutor did take further action to 
uncover or invite input in aggravation of sentencing (i.e., the 
prosecutor was presenting aggravating circumstances, 
specifically, that Appellant had not undergone therapy for his 
previous sexual offense conviction), the prosecutor 
misrepresented to Appellant (i.e., did not fulfill his promise) 
this material inducement and, accordingly, Appellantfs plea 
cannot be said to be voluntarily made. See Bailey, 914 F.2d at 
1440. 
II. WHETHER THE STATE VIOLATED ITS PLEA 
AGREEMENT WITH THE APPELLANT 
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In Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504 (1984), the United States 
Supreme Court stated: 
We began by acknowledging that the conditions for a valid 
plea "presuppose fairness in securing agreement between an 
accused an a prosecutor. . . . The plea must, of course, be 
voluntary and knowing and if it was induced by promises the 
essence of those promises must in some way be made known." It 
follows that when the prosecution breaches its promise with 
respect to an executed plea agreement, the defendant pleads 
guilty on a false premise, and hence his conviction cannot stand: 
1[W]hen a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or 
agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said part of the 
inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled. 
Id. at 509 (quoting Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261-62 
(1971)) (footnote omitted). See also United States v. Gines. 964 
F.2d 972, 979 (10th Cir. 1992). 
Again, the prosecutor promised Appellant: "The prosecutor 
will provide Adult Probation and Parole with all information in 
the prosecution file regarding any known contacts regarding this 
case. Thereafter, the prosecutor agrees not to take further 
action to uncover or invite input in aggravation of sentencing." 
(See, R., File # 39, Affidavit of Defendant at 1 7(u).) But, 
again, that promise was clearly not fulfilled. Because "the 
prosecutor breache[d] its promise with respect to an executed 
plea agreement, [Appellant pled] guilty on a false premise, and 
hence his conviction cannot standf,]" (see Mabry 467 U.S. at 
509), and, accordingly, Appellant should be permitted to withdraw 
his guilty plea. 
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III. WHETHER APPELLANT RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE 
OF COUNSEL DURING HIS MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA 
A. Standard 
"The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must 
be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning 
of the adversarial process that the [appeal] cannot be relied on 
as having produced a just result." See State v. Holland, 230 
Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 20 (1994) (Stewart, J. and Durham, J., 
concurring) (alteration inserted); see also United States v. 
Smith, 10 F.3d 724, 728 (10th Cir. 1993). 
"Generally, an appellant cannot raise an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim for the first time on appeal because 
the trial record is insufficient to allow the claim to be 
determined." State v. Villarreal. 857 P.2d 949, 953 (Utah App. 
1993) (citing Humphries, 818 P.2d at 1029; accord State v. 
Alvarado, 845 P.2d 966, 970 (Utah App. 1993); State v. Schnoor. 
845 P.2d 947, 950 (Utah App. 1993); Smith, 10 F.3d at 728; United 
States v. Kay, 961 F.2d 1505, 1508 (10th Cir. 1992); Beaulieu v. 
United States, 930 F.2d 805, 806 (10th Cir. 1991). "However, an 
appellant can raise such a claim if the trial record is adequate 
to permit determination of the issue and there is new counsel on 
appeal." Alvarado, 845 P.2d 966 (citing Humphries, 818 P.2d at 
1029 and State v. Johnson, 823 P.2d 484, 487 (Utah App. 1991)). 
With respect to the foregoing, Appellant asserts that his claim 
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satisfies the Humphries standard inasmuch as the trial record is 
adequate to permit determination of his claim and he is 
represented by new counsel. 
"In considering claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, 
Utah courts have consistently applied the test articulated by the 
United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 687 [sic] (1984)." State v. Hallett. 856 P.2d 1060 1062 
(Utah 1993) (internal quotations omitted) (citations omitted). 
"In order to constitute ineffective assistance, counselfs 
performance must, first, fall below an objective standard of 
reasonableness and , second, prejudice the outcome of the 
proceedings." State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 545 (Utah 1994) 
(citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689) . Accord State v. Tempiin, 
805 P.2d 162, 186 (Utah 1990); accord State v. Alvarado, 845 P.2d 
966, 970 (Utah App. 1993); Harris v. Champion. 15 F.3d 1538, 1569 
(10th cir. 1994) . "A defendant must overcome the strong 
presumption that 'counsel's conduct falls within the wide range 
of reasonable professional assistance[.] f" Smith, 10 F.3d at 728 
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689); accord Laycock v. State of 
New Mexico. 880 F.2d 1184, 1187 (10th Cir. 1987); Tempiin. 805 
P.2d at 186. 
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A. Deficient Performance\Objective Standard of Reasonableness 
To establish deficient performance, Appellant "must show 
counselfs performance !fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness1 measured by "prevailing norms."" Harris, 15 F.3d 
at 1569 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688) . Appellant asserts 
that in Appellant's Motion to Withdraw his Guilty Plea defense 
counsel Rasmussenfs performance fell below an objective standard 
of reasonableness because he failed, first, to raise the issue of 
whether Appellant's plea was made knowingly and voluntarily and, 
second, whether the prosecution violated the plea agreement. 
B. Prejudice\Reasonability Probability 
"To show prejudice under the second component of the test, a 
defendant must proffer sufficient evidence to support 'a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.1" 
Parsons v. Barnes. 871 P.2d 516, 522 (Utah 1994) (quoting 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694); accord Tempiin, 805 P.2d at 187; 
State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 894 n.30 (Utah 1989); Harris, 15 
F.3d at 1569. "A reasonable probability is a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 694; e.g., Parsons 871 P.2d at 522. 
By not raising the foregoing issues before the trial court 
and arguing well-established caselaw, there is a reasonable 
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probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome 
because the trial court would have concluded, first, that the 
prosecutor did take action to uncover or invite impute in 
aggravation of sentencing, a clear misrepresentation of the 
prosecutorfs promise to Appellant and, second, that action broke 
the terms of plea agreement and, accordingly, permit Appellant to 
withdraw his guilty plea. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing Appellant should be granted the 
relief requested. 
DATED this 1 day of July, 1994. 
David L. GrindstafF" ^-^ 
Attorney for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the 
foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF was HAND-DELIVERED, postage prepaid 
this 1 day of July, 1994 to: 
Jan Graham 
Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
SLC, Utah 84114 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRiCT*1*' ^ J 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE ^ P..UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs, 
DOYLE CLARENCE KELSTROM, 
Defendant. 
Li c r {f 
RULING ON DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO WITHDRAW 
PLEA OF GUILTY 
Criminal No. 921700309 
Comes now the Court having reviewed Defendant Doyle 
Kelstrom's Motion to Withdraw His Plea of Guilty pursuant to 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 65B(b) and his memorandum in 
support thereof and having reviewed Plaintiff, the State of 
Utah's memorandum in opposition thereto and being fully 
advised in the premises; based upon the facts of this case, 
the statutory law as provided in Section 76-4-102 U.C.A., and 
based upon the arguments set forth in Plaintiff's Memorandum 
in Opposition, the Court hereby denies Defendant's Motion to 
Withdraw Plea of Guilty. 
Plaintiff's counsel is to prepare findings and an 
order in accordance with the Court's ruling and submit the 
same to the defendant at least five days prior to the time it 
is submitted to the Court for signature. 
Dated this 7th day of January, 1993. 
BY THE COURT: 
3^M.Me^^ 
Jon M. Memmott 
District Court Judge 
A \ 
